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Introduction 
Managers in charge of international business decisions must recog-
nize competitive conditions to make production, distribution, and 
marketing decisions. They must be cognizant of competitors' strategies 
as well as institutional arrangements which affect competition. As the 
international business environment has expanded, government regulations 
designed to control unfair or restrictive business practices have 
proliferated. Today, nearly all major developed countries with market 
economies prohibit the abuses of monopoly power and proscribe certain 
enterprise activities which restrain competition. 1 Furthermore, 
governments have become less reluctant to apply their antitrust law 
extraterritorially. The ability of multinational firms to compete in 
international markets will increasingly depend upon their recognition 
and adherence to statutes which regulate business operations. 
This paper discusses the historical development of European 
Economic Community (EEC) competition policy with regard to U.S. firms 
competing in the Common Market. The study points out the business 
practices of American multinationals that have been determined to be 
incompatib le with the EEC treaty. Further, 'the Community's settlement 
of its antitrust case with IBM, and the effects of the agreement are 
analyzed. 
The Extraterritorial Application of EEC Competition Rules 
In 1958 the Benelux countries, France, Italy, and Germany signed 
the Treaty of Rome and formed the European Economic Community. 2 The 
Treaty states in Article 3(F) that the Conununity must institute a system 
to ensure that competition in the Common Market is not distorted. 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty provide the competition law to deal 
with public and private enterprise activity. 
Article 85, paragraph one, of the EEC Treaty prohibits concerted 
practices, agreements, and decisions of enterprises, if such practices 
affect tr ad e between EEC member states and have the object of preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition within the EEC.3 Article 85(1) 
points out that price fixing, market sharing, tying agreements and 
placing dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with oth~r 
trading partners may violate the Treaty. 
Paragraph three of Article 85 allows for exemptions from the 
prohibitions of paragraph one if the activities contribute to the 
improvement of production or distribution of goods or promote technical 
or economic progress within the EEC. Tl'\us, Article 85 does not proscribe 
any activity per se, and, in theory, any restraint of trade may be 
deemed acceptable if economic or technological improvements are likely 
to be forthcoming. 
Article 86 prohibits the abuse of a dominant market position by one 
or more enterprises if trade is affected in a substantial part of the 
4 Common Market. The provision does not disallow monopolies or the 
acquisition of monopoly power, only the abuse of a dominant position is 
proscribed. The Article signals the EEC's approval of building large-
scale firms of community size to compete with foreign multinationals. 
However, the Article points out a non-exhaustive list of possible 
abuses: (1) directly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices: (2) 
limiting production, markets or technical developments; (3) applying 
dissimilar or discriminatory conditions to equivalent transactions: or 
2 
(4) concluding contracts which contain supplementary obligations that 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
The supranational administrative body primarily responsible for the 
implementation of competition policy is the EEC Commission. The Commis-
sion has fourteen members which represent all nationalities in the 
Community. The Commission has the power, granted under Regulation 17, 
to investigate business practices, invoke the prohibitions of Articles 
85(1) and 86, and grant exemptions from prohibition under Article 
85(3). 5 The Commission is advised by the Competition Directorate-
General (DG IV) which consists of approximately fifty officials. 
In 1969, the EEC extended for the first time a ban on enterprise 
activities to companies with headquarters in non-member countries. The 
extraterritorial application of Article 85 occurred in the Aniline Dyes 
Cartel (69/243) decision which established the "unity of the group 
theory." 6 Eleven aniline dye manufacturers, including three in Switzer-
land and one in the United Kingdom, were fined a total of 540,000 units 
of account for participating in a restrictive practice involving uniform 
and simultaneous price increases throughout the Common Market. The 
Commission reasoned that when a parent and a subsidiary form a single 
economic unit then the action of a subsidiary can be imputed to the 
parent company, and, consequently, EEC rules of competition are 
applicable to all restrictions of competition which affect trade in the 
Common Market. 
The advent of EEC extraterritorial jurisdiction has resulted in an 
increase in the application of EEC competition provisions to U.S. firms. 
In 1970, Continental Can Company of New York, through its European 
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subsidiary Europemballage, signed an agreement to purchase the Dutch firm 
7 
Thomassen. Continental purchased 91 percent of Thomassen in April of 
1970. The Commission i mmediately opened an investigation of the acqui-
sition and in December of 1971 decided Continental Can had abused its 
dominant market position in the light metal container industry by its 
purchase of Thomassen. The Commission reasoned that the acquisition had 
practically eliminated competition in certain packaging products in the 
EEC. Although the Court of Justice annulled the Commission's decision 
in 1972 for not sufficiently showing the facts on which the decision was 
based, the precedent of attempting to regulate the behavior of U.S. 
firms in the Common Market was established. 8 
Since the Continental Can case, a number of American multinationals 
have been involved in EEC investigations concerning their European 
marketing and production practices. In 1975, United Brands Company 
(UBC) was fined one million units of account for price discrimination 
and refusal to supply distributors. 9 UBC, the world's largest seller of 
bananas, was found guilty of fragmenting European markets and charging 
customers different prices according to the member state, although there 
was no objective reason for such discrimination. The importance of the 
decision lies in the fact that the Commission investigated the firm's 
entire marketing policy to determine that UBC indulged in business 
practices at variance with the goals of integrated markets and undis-
torted competition in the Common Market. 
The Commission found in 1973 that General Motors Continental 
infringed Art1cle 86 by charging a price that was abusive for the issue 
of Belgian automobile inspection certificates. 10 A fine of 100,000 
units of account was levied against the firm for the infringement. In 
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1972, Commercial Solvents Corporation of New York was fined 200,000 
units for abuse of a dominant position in the nitropropane market, and 
for the first time in any Community competition-law case the Commission 
fined the company 1000 units for each day'.s delay in paying the fine. 11 
The Commission held that Commercial Solvents abused its dominant market 
position by refusing to sell nitropropane to an Italian firm, ZOJA, and, 
thus, appreciably restricted competition in the EEC. 
Although the above-mentioned American firms were fined for prac-
tices which infringed on EEC competition laws, other U.S. multinationals 
have received favorable rulings from the Commission and Court of 
Justice. Several agreements for joint research and development between 
U.S. enterprises and Common ·Market firms have been authorized. 
The Commission maintains that efforts made in pure and applied 
research detennine the competitiveness of enterprises and enhance the 
possibility of development in the economy. 12 Also, they recognize the 
research hastens the pace of technological innovation. Consequently, 
the Comrnission has tried to remove obstacles to the cooperation of 
enterprises in research and development throughout the 10-nation group. 
Article 85, paragraph three, of the Rome.Treaty empowers the Commission 
to exempt business activities from the ban on restrictive practices if a 
contribution to technical or economic progress is likely to result. 
A rather remarkable exemption was granted by the Commission in 
13 Henkel-Colgate (72/41). The Henkel-Colgate decision is highly indica-
tive of the balancing process utilized in the EEC to determine the 
acceptability of concerted practices. Henkel of Dusseldorf, and 
Colgate-Palmolive of New York entered into an agreement to coordinate 
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their development of laundry soaps and detergents. Although Henkel and 
Colgate controlled 37 percent of a highly oligopolistic market, the 
Commission approved the agreement because they believed consumers would 
receive a fair share of the benefits from the cooperation through a 
greater supply of improved products. The Commission contended that 
"technical progress" from the joint efforts was predictable, and compe-
tition between Henkel-Colgate and its two other large competitors would 
be promoted. 
In a similar case, an exemption from prohibition was granted by the 
Commission on a specialization agreement between DeLaval Turbine Inter-
national in Trenton, New Jersey and Stork Corporation, located in 
14 Amsterdam. DeLaval and Stork formed a joint venture in the Nether-
lands for the purpose of combining their production and marketing 
activities throughout Europe. The firms agreed to cooperate in the 
development, manufacture, maintenance and sale of compressors used in 
heat recovery equipment in large-scale plants. The Commission pointed 
out in its findings that the agreement should benefit users by allowing 
a jointly-owned plant to operate near capacity, thus reducing the 
proportion of total costs represented by fixed costs and, ultimately, 
lowering prices. 
The important implication from the exemptions granted under Article 
85(3) of the EEC Treaty is that American firms with specific technical 
expertise may be able to efficiently penetrate European markets by 
entering into joint cooperation agreements with Common Market firms. 
Also, specialization agreements between U.S. and European firms which 
rationalize the production or distribution process have been viewed 
favorably by the Cornmission. 15 
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The cases cited suggest that supranational governmental actions 
designed to promote · competition have a significant effect on the plan-
ning and operation of U.S. firms competing in the EEC. Regulation, 
legislation, and litigation affect the businesses multinationals enter, 
the risk associated with attaining corporate goals, and research and 
development priorities. The Conunon Market's settlement on August 1, 
1984 of its long-standing investigation of the business practices of IBM 
is likely to produce the most profound effects for multinationals to 
date. 
Background of the IBM Case 
The EEC Directorate of Competition began an investigation of the 
marketing practices of International Business Machines of Armonk, New 
York, (IBM), in 1974 after receiving complaints from five of IBM's 
,::ompetitors in the Common Market. 16 All five companies were subsi-
d:i.oid .E~s of U.S. -based f irrns and included Memorex Corp. , Amdahl Corp. , 
National Advanced Systems, Manguson Corp., and Four-Phase Systems, Inc. 
The firms had long complained that IBM dragged its feet in servicing and 
updating programs run on non-IBM hardware. Specifically, IBM was 
accused of delays in updating, debugging, and making engineering cor-
rections of the software. In addition to such charges, Amdahl Corp. 
accused IBM of generating fear, uncertainty, and doubt - known as "fud" 
in industry circles - in the software market. Allegedly, between the 
time a new IBM software product is announced and shipped, IBM salesmen 
create "fud" in customers by not making public the operating principles 
of the interface between software and computer hardware.
17 
Thus, the 
Commission conducted an investigation between 1974 and 1980 of the 
7 
marketing practices of IBM and its subsidiaries to detennine if the 
practices amounted to an abuse of a dominant market position within the 
meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. 
The EEC's case, filed in December of 1980, strongly resembled the 
U.S. Justice Department's 13-year antitrust investigation and civil suit 
against IBM. However, the U.S. dropped its case in January of 1982 
after six years of trial, saying the evidence was "flimsy" and the case 
was "without merit. 1118 During this time, IBM won or settled 16 private 
antitrust suits, including a Supreme Court decision involving Memorex 
Corp., one of the U.S. companies which complained to the Common Market. 
The Common Market pressed on in its case, despite the considerable 
economic might which IBM wielded in the negotiations. The company 
publicly and privately informed the European Community that they 
annually bought close to $2 billion of goods and services from 50,000 
European supplies; in 1983 invested $1 billion in land, buildings, and 
equipment; had 87,000 European employees; and operated 15 manufacturing 
19 plants and 9 research centers. These facts are indicative of IBM's 
European economic power, but the $1 billion which the company paid in 
European taxes in 1983 was probably more signific .ant in the settlement 
. . 20 negot1at1ons. 
Besides taking on a firm of extensive economic importance in the 
European Cornmunity, the EEC had to contend with U.S. government inter-
vention on behalf of IBM. Only a few days after the June 8, 1982 
announcement of the dismissal of the U.S. antitrust case against IBM, 
William Baxter, chief of the Justice Department's antitrust division, 
personally appealed to officials of the EEC Commission attending a Paris 
meeting of the OECD to curb the European case against the computer 
8 
company. Also, the U.S. invoked special diplomatic procedures and for 
the first time sent an official observer to European Commission anti-
trust hearings. Sherman Unger, the genera l counsel of the Commerce 
Department, was dispatched to work with the Europeans to head off 
problems. 
The U.S. contingent maintained throughout the proceedings that a 
ruling against IBM would reduce the firm's profits from innovation, 
negatively affect U.S. trade, and have extraterritorial effects. The 
dismissal of the U.S. case against IBM and the intervention in the EEC 
led Judge David Edelstein, who presided over the U.S. case, to raise 
questions about a possible conflict of interest on Mr. Baxter's part. A 
letter to Mr. Baxter, made public by Edelstein, stated: 
The U.S. government is now bootstrapping your 
action [dropping the IBM case] int o its attempt 
to pressure the EEC to drop its charges against 
IBM ••. I must seriously question whether you 
have kept your faith with either the administration 
or with your professional responsibilities. Needless 
to say, I believe your dismissal of the IBM case (in 
the U.S.} did maj or damage to our judicial process. 
I also believe it was deliberately timed so as to 
ben~f~t_a s~~gle U.S. company in its international 
activities. 
The effect of Baxter and Unger 's "participation" on the EEC's 
persistence in the case is indeterminable , but the perception existed 
among Community officials that U.S. represe ntatives were motivated by 
the belief that "what's good for IBM is good for the u.s." 22 
At stake for IBM was its European business, which contributed abou~ 
30\ ($12 bi lli on) of its 1983 revenue of $40. 18 billion. The remedy 
which IBM feared the most would force the company to disclose details of 
interfaces a t the same time it announced a new product. Consequently, a 
key element in IBM's legal defense was the contention that early 
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disclosure could eliminate the company's lead time on new products 
around the world and reduce the incentive to innovate. Further, LBM 
representatives at the Conunission argued that IBM should not have to 
disclose valuable proprietary information when judge after judge in the 
U.S. had ruled that the company didn't have to disclose technical 
details before shipment. Finally, IBM lawyers maintained that the 
Commission breached established principles of international law, namely 
the principles of comity or non -int erference in internal affairs o_f the 
United States. 23 The comity principle maintains that a state has a duty 
to consider its exercise of enforcement jurisdic tion in the face of 
potential conflict with the law or policy of another state with a 
substantial interest in the matter. IBM's contention was that since the 
case was not settled in the U.S. in 1980, the Community should not have 
issued a statement of objections indicating their intention to make a 
decision on the legality of IBM practices in the EEC. 
Particulars of the IBM Case 
In the statement of objectives issued December 19, 1980 by the 
Director General for Competition, the Commission informed IBM that a 
procedure pursuant to Regulation 17 had been ·initiated and that a 
decision regarding infringements of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty was 
f h 
. 24 ort coming. The marketing practices of IBM were investigated for 
infringements under Article 86 because the statute prohibits the abusive 
exploitation by one or more firms of a dominant position within the 
Common Market. Specifically, the Article proscribes activities which 
limit product or technical developments, or " tying contracts," i.e., 
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when a product is sold only on the condition that the buyer purchase 
certain additional products or services from the seller. 
The Commission did not set forth the criteria it used for · 
establishing its jurisdiction over IBM's activities in the 15 page 
settlement issued in early August. However, IBM has 15 European 
manufacturing plants, which produce ninety percent of the computers and 
data processing equipment the company sells in the EEC. Also, the firm 
controls almost two-thirds of Europe's market for "mainframe" computers, 
and is the foremost supplier in every country. Clearly, the extensive 
European operations of IBM provided the foundation for the Common 
Market's claim to jurisdiction in the case. 
In order for the Commission to impose a fine or to make an order 
for termination of an infringement under Article 86, it had to establish 
that IBM held a dominant position in a specific geographic and product 
market and that an abusive practice had taken place. It must be pointed 
out that, historically, the Commission has been virtually indifferent to 
how dominance was acquired. Instead, the main emphasis has been on 
supervising the use of market power toward suppliers and purchasers once 
dominance had been achieved. 
The issue of whether a firm has a dominant market position is 
concerned with structural competition. The Commission must determine 
that an enterprise holds a dominant position in a specific market before 
the question of abusive behavior is considered. The Court of Justice 
established in its Continental Can (6/72) decision that a full market 
power analysis is required to establish market dominance.
25 
No exact 
percentage of market share has been established as a threshold for 
automatically indicating a dominant position. Thus, the Commission 
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considers a firm's control over raw materials and capital; its command 
over techno l ogical expertise; as well as the likelihood for the develop-
t f . 26 men o competitors. 
The second determination the Commission undertook in the IBM matter 
involved behavioral aspects of competition under Article 86. This area 
concerned the abusive use of economic power by the company. Obviously, 
many enterprise activities may ultimately be found to violate EEC 
competition rules. However, at the time of the IBM investigation, . the 
abuses which had been prohibited under Article 86 were: 
1) the imposition of unfair terms and conditions upon members of 
an association which. controlled music performance rights; 
2) a merger which substantially reduced competition; 
3) a refusal to supply goods to a longstanding customer; 
4) the excessive pricing of automobile inspection certificates; 
5) discriminatory pricing; and 
6) the imposition of exclusive purchase privileges. 
This list suggests that the definition of what constitutes an 
abusive practice has primarily been determined on a case-by-case basis. 
The conclusion that can be reached from this approach is that abuses 
occur where the Commission finds them to exist, and that the process is 
meant to be a deterrent to firms with market power in their relations 
with customers and competitors. 
The Commission's case against IBM was founded upon the premise that 
the firm occupied a dominant market position in the supply of central 
processing units and basic software for the IBM 360 and 370 type 
computer systems and, thus, independently controlled the operation and 
. f h . 27 maintenance o sue units. The Commission estimated that IBM had 40\ 
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of the total computer market (mainframes and microcomputers) and 38\ of 
the data processing market in Europe. Furthermore, the Commission 
adhered to the criterion established by the Court of Justice in the 
Continental Can (6/72) decision, namely that dominance exists when a 
firm has the power to act independently without considering competitors, 
purchasers, or suppliers. IBM's market share was a smaller percentage 
than the market shares of firms conside red dominant in many EEC deci-
sions taken under Article 86 , ·but IBM's sales revenues in 1983 were 
seven times greater than its nearest competitor and actually totaled 
more than the sales of the nine next largest companies combined. 
Data Processing Revenues In Western Europe 
1983 
($ millions) 
1. IBM (U.S. ) 10,634 
2. Bull (France) 1,537 
3. Siemens (W. Germany) 1,380 
4. Olivetti (Italy) 1,160 
5. Digital Equipment (U.S.) 1,053 
6. ICL (U. K.) 984 
7. Nixdrof (W. Germany) 926 
8. Burroughs (U.S . ) 860 
9. NCR (U.S.) 841 
10. Hewlett-Packard (U. S.) 775 
Source: International Data Corporation 
Based upon this information, the Commission established that IBM 
market power was great enough to meet the minimal requir ement of 
dominance, i.e., the ability to affect trade between member states. The 
most important implication from the Commission's determination of 
dominance in this case is it showed that the question of market 
dominance can be settled before competition is eliminated. Thus, the 
touchstone to dominance in the IBM case was the power to prevent or 
interfere with effective competition between member states. 
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The EEC Commission determined through its investigation that IBM 
had abused its dominant position under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty in 
four ways: 
1) by failing to supply other manufacturers, in sufficient time, 
with the technical information needed to permit competitive 
products to be used with System/370 ("interface information"); 
2) by not offering System/370 central processing units ("CPU's") 
without a capacity of main memory included in the price ("memory 
bundling"); 
3) by not offering System/370 CPU's without the basic software 
included in the price ("software bundling"); and 
4) by discriminating between users of IBM software, in that IBM 
refused to supply certain software installation services 
("Installation Productivity Options"= IPOs) to users of non-IBM 
1 
. . 28 centra processing units. 
These practices infringed on EEC competition laws because they limited 
choice among purchasers and restricted opportunities for competitors who 
offer products designed to compete with as well as be compatible with 
IBM computer systems. The abuses fall into three categories under 
Article 86: tying arrangements (bundling); limiting production or 
technological developments; and discriminatory practices. 
IBM's marketing policy of supplying main memory or basic software 
with central processing units was considered "bundling" by the 
Commission because the components were supplied without a separate 
price. The practice was considered an abuse of a dominant market 
position because IBM was perceived as protecting its position against 
manufacturers which produce processing elements designed to be plug-
14 
compatible with IBM's System/370 computers. In the Commission's view, 
"bundling" precluded European plug-compatible manufacturers from selling 
their own memory devices , interfered with techn ical developments, and 
had the potential of reducing the number of European firms in the 
computer industry. As pointed out, IBM engaged in both "software 
bundling " and "memory bundling." 
An abusive practice which aided the Corranission in its determination 
of IBM's market dominance was the recognition of the company's ability 
to "freeze" most of the European computer market. The situation occurs 
when IBM announces a new product but doesn't disclose the technical 
details, known as interface information. The information describes the 
physical interconnection and electronic interaction between various 
components of a computer system which plug together. In order for 
competitors' p ro ducts to communicate with IBM machines, a set of rules 
and formats used by IBM computers, referred to as Systems Network 
Architecture (SNA), must be known. 
When IBM introduced its System/360 computer in 1964, the principles 
of operation were released well in advance of product shipment. However, 
as IBM gained dominance in the market the practice of releasing inter-
face information ceased, and IBM began releasing details only when it 
shipped a product to a customer. 29 Beginning with the int roduction of 
the System/370 in 1971, announcement of a new product has preceded the 
actual shipment by as much as 18 months. 
IBM's r efusal to provide technical information creates fear, 
uncertainty, and doubt ("fud") among European customers. Potential 
buyers are reluctant to pu~chase IBM plug-compatible equipment because, 
with a new IBM product coming, they aren't sure that other equipment 
15 
will stay compatible. Thus, the Conunission decided that IBM's failure 
to release interface information was an abusive practice due to the 
detrimental effect on the incentive for IBM competitors to undertake 
innovation. 
The Commission also contended that IBM had unfairly discriminated 
against EEC computer purchasers who used or desired to use IBM software 
with non-IBM computer systems. The complaints were submitted to the 
Commission by users of IBM products or competing products, not by .the 
five firms which made the original objections. IBM software customers 
claimed that IBM delayed service or refused to supply software unless such 
equipment was used with an IBM central processing unit. Specifically, 
they alleged that IBM refused to supply a service known as an Installa-
tion Productivity Option (IPO) to users of central processing units 
produced by manufacturers other than IBM. 
IBM's dilatoriness in providing and servicing its software used on 
non-IBM mainframes impaired competition in the EEC because computer 
purchasers were apprehensive about buying non-IBM products without the 
assurance of IBM's full and prompt support and service for its software. 
Thus, the Commission considered the practice an abusive use of IBM's 
market power, as it likely impeded the ability of non-IBM computer 
manufacturers to penetrate and compete effective l y in the Conunon 
30 Market. 
The August 1984 settlement of the EEC-IBM case was reached after 
protracted Commission hearings and negotiations with IBM. After a 
hearing in February 1982, the ColMllission sent IBM a statement of the 
remedies dealing with the issues of memory bundling and interface 
disclosure. IBM suggested discussions take place with Commission 
16 
officials to resolve the remaining concerns in the case. Informal 
discussions started in April 1983 in parallel with the formal proceed-
ings. A second hearing in June 1983 resulted from t~e proceedings. The 
June hearing produced a preliminary draft decision which was then 
submitted to the Advisory Committee of national experts in June 1984. A 
final solution acceptable to the Commission was announced on August 2, 
1984. 
The Settlement and Effects of the Undertaking 
The agreement between the Common Market and IBM outlines four 
points to which IBM must adhere. The agreement is scheduled to last at 
least until January of 1990. 
The most important point requires that IBM provide, within four 
months after announcing a new computer, sufficient interface information 
to enable competing companies in the EEC to attach both hardware and 
software products of their design to the System/370. Another point in 
the agreement mandates IBM to disclose adequate and timely technical 
details of the Systems Network Architecture for the System/370. A 
speed-up in the publication of such information will better enable 
competitors to hook up their products to communicate with IBM machines. 
Further, IBM must undertake to offer its System/370 CPUs in the EEC, 
either without main memory or with only the capacity necessary for 
testing. Finally, IBM is to continue its efforts to match its Systems 
Network Architecture to the communications standard used by other 
. ( ) 31 European companies, called Open Systems Interconnection OSI • 
The EEC is of the opinion that the agreement will have the effect 
of substantially improving the position of both users and competitors in 
17 
the markets for System/370 products in the EEC. The earlier avail-
ability of interface information allows competitors the opportunity of 
putting their products on the market simultaneously with an IBM intro-
duction. Consequently, the Commission expects the structure of 
competition in the Common Market to be strengthened and made more 
effective. The clear statement regarding IBM's conduct also introduces 
an element of certainty to customers which had been missing. Potential 
buyers will have more assurance that equipment purchased from othe~ 
manufacturers will be compatible with IBM products. Thus, much of the 
fear, uncertainty, and doubt generated by IBM's announcement of new 
products will be eliminated. Additionally, users will now be given the 
possibility of a choice between different hardware and software suppliers 
at an earlier time. 
Finally, as a result of IBM's agreement to offer customers the 
chance to buy mainframe computers without purchasing data-storage 
memory, customers will have the opportunity to purchase main memory at a 
lower price from an IBM rival. As IBM abandons the practice of bundling 
substantial capacities of main memory, users will enjoy choices and 
competitors' opportunities which have not existed previously. 
Conclusion 
The European Economic Community's August 1984 settlement of its 
competition case against International Business Machines, the world's 
largest computer manufacturer, brought to an end the longest and most 
complex competition action in EEC history. It marks the first time any 
government entity has persuaded IBM to meet a specific schedule for 
technical disclosures after a product announcement. Also, it appears to 
18 
be the first agreement to establish formal procedures by which IBM's 
business practices can be reviewed by a government body. 
The agreement between IBM and the EEC may have widespread ramifi-
cations for the computer industry in Europe as well as dominant companies 
in other industries. Although the compromise settlement only indicates 
what changes IBM must make in its European marketing practices, the 
guidelines can be expected to affect the conduct of multinational 
enterprises competing in the Common Market. Further, it is clear that 
the Commission is confident in its ability to proficiently analyze and 
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